寄件者： George Luk
日期： 2014年8月28日 下午10:27
主旨：給特區的信（７１）－北京共識的終結－－
收件者： "Mr. Li Wei" , "Mr. C Y Leung"日期： 2014年8月28日 下午10:27
主旨：給特區的信（７１）－北京共識的終結－－
副本： "Mr. Tsang Tak Sing" , "Ms. TENG Yu Yan" , George1 Luk
李偉先生／梁振英先生：
以下摘自四年半前姚洋「北京大學國家發展研究院院長，（
Beijing''''s ongoing efforts to promote growth are infringing on people's economic and political rights. In order to survive, the Chinese government will have to start allowing ordinary citizens to take part in the political process.
YANG YAO is Dean of the National School of Development and the Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.
1. 自從中國從1978年開始經濟改革，每年的經濟增長率都在10%
2. 不出意料，
3. 由於在經濟發展收入增長之外，中國人民開始提出更多要求，
4. 過去30年來，
5. 中國增長奇跡留下了不穩定因素。然而，其他發展中國家也深受“中
6. 目前的經濟高度依賴外需，使得中國和主要交易夥伴摩擦不斷。GD
7. 儘管坐擁無上權力，又有近期的經濟發展成績單，
8. 更重要的是，北京當局持續提升GDP增長的努力將不可避免的的會
9. 過去30年的改革大多數都是對迫在眉睫的危機所做出的回應。
10. 在像美國這樣的先進民主國家中，
An open and inclusive political process has generally checked the power of interest groups in advanced democracies such as the United States. Indeed, this is precisely the mandate of a disinterested government -- to balance the demands of different social groups. A more open Chinese government could still remain disinterested if the right democratic institutions were put in place to keep the most powerful groups at bay.
But ultimately, there is no alternative to greater democratization if the CCP wishes to encourage economic growth and maintain social stability.
Regards,
George Luk
---------- 轉寄的郵件 ----------
寄件者： <doe@had.gov.hk>
日期： 2014年8月27日 下午12:29
主旨： Re: 給特區的信（７１）－市場與政府的關係
收件者： gl2468@gmail.com
George Luk 先生:
謝謝你於2014年8月25日的電郵。本處已備悉你的意見。
東區民政事務專員
(吳穎嫻 代行)
日期： 2014年8月27日 下午12:29
主旨： Re: 給特區的信（７１）－市場與政府的關係
收件者： gl2468@gmail.com
George Luk 先生:
謝謝你於2014年8月25日的電郵。本處已備悉你的意見。
東區民政事務專員
(吳穎嫻 代行)
附件1
The End of the Beijing Consensus
Can
China's Model of Authoritarian Growth Survive?
Since
China began undertaking economic reforms in 1978, its economy has grown at a
rate of nearly ten percent a year, and its per-capita GDP is now twelve times
greater than it was three decades ago. Many analysts attribute the country's
economic success to its unconventional approach to economic policy -- a
combination of mixed ownership, basic property rights, and heavy government
intervention. Time magazine's former foreign editor, Joshua Cooper Ramo, has
even given it a name: the Beijing consensus.
But, in fact, over the last 30 years, the Chinese
economy has moved unmistakably toward the market doctrines of neoclassical
economics, with an emphasis on prudent fiscal policy, economic openness,
privatization, market liberalization, and the protection of private property.
Beijing has been extremely cautious in maintaining a balanced budget and
keeping inflation down. Purely redistributive programs have been kept to a
minimum, and central government transfers have been primarily limited to
infrastructure spending. The overall tax burden (measured by the ratio of tax
revenue to GDP) is in the range of 20 to 25 percent. The country is the world's
second-largest recipient of foreign direct investment, and domestically, more
than 80 percent of its state-owned enterprises have been released to private
hands or transformed into publicly listed companies. Since the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) lacks legitimacy in the classic democratic sense, it has
been forced to seek performance-based legitimacy instead, by continuously
improving the living standards of Chinese citizens. So far, this strategy has
succeeded, but there are signs that it will not last because of the growing
income inequality and the internal and external imbalances it has created.
The CCP's free-market policies have, predictably,
led to major income disparities in China. The overall Gini coefficient -- a
measure of economic inequality in which zero equals perfect equality and one
absolute inequality -- reached 0.47 in 2008, the same level as in the United
States. More disturbing, Chinese city dwellers are now earning three and a half
times as much as their fellow citizens in the countryside, the highest
urban-rural income gap in the world.
How, then, has the Chinese government been able to
adopt the principles of neoclassical economics while still claiming Marxism as
its ideological anchor? The answer is that China has for three decades been
ruled by a disinterested government -- a detached, unbiased regime that takes a
neutral stance when conflicts of interest arise among different social and
political groups. This does not mean that Beijing has been devoid of
self-interest. On the contrary, the state is often predatory toward citizens,
but its predation is "identity-blind" in the sense that Beijing does
not generally care about the social and political status of its chosen prey --
unlike many governments elsewhere that act to protect and enrich specific
social or political groups. As a consequence, the Chinese government has been
more likely than other authoritarian regimes to adopt growth-enhancing
policies.
As the Chinese people demand more than economic
gains as their income increases, it will become increasingly difficult for the
CCP to contain or discourage social discontent by administering the medicine of
economic growth alone.
For the last 30 years, the CCP has intentionally
adopted policies favoring specific groups or regions to promote reform and
economic growth. It has helped that the disinterested CCP government was not
permanently beholden to certain groups or regions. China's integration into the
world economy is a case in point. At the end of the 1970s, the United States
was eager to bring China into its camp as a buffer against Soviet hegemony, and
China quickly grasped the opportunity. Yet that early adoption of an
"open-door" policy gave rise to domestic resistance: special economic
zones, such as Shenzhen, enjoyed an abundance of preferential treatments that
other parts of the country envied. Moreover, the CCP's export-led growth model
required that Beijing embrace an unbalanced development strategy that
encouraged rapid growth on the country's east coast while neglecting the
interior; today, nearly 90 percent of China's exports still come from the nine
coastal provinces.
China's accession to the World Trade Organization
in 2001 was also a calculated move. Before accession, it was widely believed
that China would have to endure painful structural adjustment policies in many
sectors in order to join the WTO. Even so, the central government actually
accelerated negotiations with the organization's members. Despite the burdens
it placed on the agriculture and retailing sectors, accession boosted China's
exports, proving wrong those who worried about its effects. Between 2002 and
2007, Chinese exports grew by an annual rate of 29 percent, double the average
rate during the 1990s.
China's astronomic growth has left it in a
precarious situation, however. Other developing countries have suffered from
the so-called middle-income trap -- a situation that often arises when a
country's per-capita GDP reaches the range of $3,000 to $8,000, the economy
stops growing, income inequality increases, and social conflicts erupt. China
has entered this range, and the warning signs of a trap loom large.
In the last several years, government involvement
in the economy has increased -- most notably with the current
four-trillion-yuan ($586 billion) stimulus plan. Government investment helped
China reach a GDP growth rate of nearly nine percent in 2009, which many applaud;
but in the long run, it could suffocate the Chinese economy by reducing
efficiency and crowding out more vibrant private investment.
The economy currently depends heavily on external
demand, creating friction among major trading partners. Savings account for 52
percent of GDP, and consumption has dropped to a historic low. Whereas
governments in most advanced democracies spend less than eight percent of
government revenue on capital investment, this figure is close to 50 percent in
China. And residential income as a share of national income is declining,
making the average citizen feel poorer while the economy expands. As the
Chinese people demand more than economic gains as their income increases, it
will become increasingly difficult for the CCP to contain or discourage social
discontent by administering the medicine of economic growth alone.
Despite its absolute power and recent track record
of delivering economic growth, the CCP has still periodically faced resistance
from citizens. The Tiananmen incident of April 5, 1976, the first spontaneous
democratic movement in PRC history, the June 4 movement of 1989, and numerous
subsequent protests proved that the Chinese people are quite willing to stage
organized resistance when their needs are not met by the state. International
monitoring of China's domestic affairs has also played an important role; now
that it has emerged as a major global power, China is suddenly concerned about
its legitimacy on the international stage.
The Chinese government generally tries to manage
such popular discontent by providing various "pain relievers,"
including programs that quickly address early signs of unrest in the
population, such as reemployment centers for unemployed workers, migration
programs aimed at lowering regional disparities, and the recent "new
countryside movement" to improve infrastructure, health care, and
education in rural areas.
Those measures, however, may be too weak to
discourage the emergence of powerful interest groups seeking to influence the
government. Although private businesses have long recognized the importance of
cultivating the government for larger profits, they are not alone. The
government itself, its cronies, and state-controlled enterprises are quickly
forming strong and exclusive interest groups. In a sense, local governments in
China behave like corporations: unlike in advanced democracies, where one of
the key mandates of the government is to redistribute income to improve the
average citizen's welfare, local governments in China simply pursue economic
gain.
More important, Beijing's ongoing efforts to
promote GDP growth will inevitably result in infringements on people's economic
and political rights. For example, arbitrary land acquisitions are still
prevalent in some cities, the government closely monitors the Internet, labor
unions are suppressed, and workers have to endure long hours and unsafe
conditions. Chinese citizens will not remain silent in the face of these
infringements, and their discontent will inevitably lead to periodic
resistance. Before long, some form of explicit political transition that allows
ordinary citizens to take part in the political process will be necessary.
The reforms carried out over the last 30 years
have mostly been responses to imminent crises. Popular resistance and economic
imbalances are now moving China toward another major crisis. Strong and
privileged interest groups and commercialized local governments are blocking
equal distribution of the benefits of economic growth throughout society, thereby
rendering futile the CCP's strategy of trading economic growth for people's
consent to its absolute rule.
An open and inclusive political process has
generally checked the power of interest groups in advanced democracies such as
the United States. Indeed, this is precisely the mandate of a disinterested
government -- to balance the demands of different social groups. A more open
Chinese government could still remain disinterested if the right democratic
institutions were put in place to keep the most powerful groups at bay. But
ultimately, there is no alternative to greater democratization if the CCP
wishes to encourage economic growth and maintain social stability.
附件2
姚洋的博客 2010-05-26 16:01:20
北大中國經濟研究中心主任
http://yaoyangblog.blog.163.com/blog/static/82627853201042641206/
北京共識的終結－－中國的威權主義增長模式還能延續嗎？
自從中國從1978年開始經濟改革，每年的經濟增長率都在10%左右，現在其人均GDP是30年前的12倍。許多分析家認為中國的經濟的成功要歸因於它非常規的經濟政策－－混合型所有制，基本的財產所有權，以及政府的大力干預的綜合。時代雜誌前外文編輯約拿·C·拉莫給它起名為：北京共識。
但是實際上，過去的30年裡，中國經濟準確無誤的朝著新古典經濟學理論的市場信條邁進，強調謹慎的財政政策、經濟開放、私有化、自由市場、和保護私有產權。北京極度小心地維持著財政平衡，壓低通貨膨脹。純粹的再分配計畫被限制到最小，中央政府的經濟調配主要局限於基礎設施開支。總體稅收負擔（計算方法：稅收收入與 GDP相除得到的比例）在20%到25%之間。中國引進外資排名世界第二。在國內，80%的國有企業都已經私有化或者成為上市公司。從經典的民主觀點來看，由於中共缺乏執政合法性，因此它被迫去不斷提高中國公民的生活水準，用這種表現來贏得合法性。到目前為止，此策略是成功的。但是它開始露出山窮水盡的跡象：收入的失衡不斷加劇，此策略也製造出了內部和外部的不平衡。
不出意料，中共的自由市場政策已經在中國導致了巨大的收入不平均。總體基尼係數（用於衡量經濟是否平等的指標，零為絕對平等，1為絕對不平等）於2008年達到了0.47，和美國相同。更讓人頭疼的是，中國的城鎮居民收入是農村的3倍半，是世界上城鄉差距最大的。
那麼，中國政府是怎樣一邊實踐新古典經濟學的原理，一邊自詡以馬克思主義為意識形態基礎的呢？答案是：30年來中國由一個中性政府來統治的－－這是一個（與利益集團）分離的，沒有（利益集團傾向性方面）偏見的政體，當不同的社會、政治團體發生利益衝突時，保持中立的姿態。這並非意味著北京當局一心為公。相反，這個政府經常掠奪公民。但是這種掠奪是“不問身份的”，北京當局總體上不在乎選擇哪些社會、政治團體作為他們的獵物－－和其他許多威權政府不同，其他政府只會保護一些特定的社會團體、政治團體，任其自肥。結果就是：中國政府比其他威權政體更精於推行發展經濟的政策。
由於在經濟發展收入增長之外，中國人民開始提出更多要求，單單將經濟發展作為良方來遏制、安撫社會不滿的招數將變得越來越困難。
過去30年來，中國有意地採取了有利於某些特定地區和群體的政策，來促進他們的改革和經濟發展。這也有助於中性的中共政府不會永久的和某些團體或地區結盟。中國如何融入世界就是一個好例子：70年代末，美國為了對抗蘇聯霸權，試圖把中國拉入其陣營。中國很快抓住了這個機會。但是早期的“對外開放”政策在國內引起了不滿：一些經濟特區如深圳，享有充裕的特惠待遇，引起其他地區的嫉妒。此外，中國的出口導向型增長模式要求北京擁抱非平衡的發展策略，鼓勵東部沿海地區快速發展，卻忽視了內地。如今，中國幾乎90%的出口依舊來自沿海九省。
中國2001年加入WTO是深思熟慮的一步棋。在入世之前，人們普遍認為中國在許多領域將經歷痛苦的結構和政策轉型。雖然如此，中央政府實際上還是加快了和WTO成員的談判。儘管加入WTO給農業和零售業帶來了沉重負擔，入世推進了中國出口，那些擔心副作用的人們被證明是多慮了。從2002年到2007 年，中國出口每年增長29%，是90年代平均出口額的兩倍。
中國增長奇跡留下了不穩定因素。然而，其他發展中國家也深受“中等收入陷阱”之苦。當一個國家的人均GDP達到3000到8000美元之間時，經濟發展開始停滯，收入不平等開始增長，社會衝突開始爆發。中國已經進入了這個階段，陷阱的預警徵兆已無法忽視。
最近的幾年，政府對經濟的干預加強。最顯著的是目前的四萬億（合5860億美元）經濟刺激計畫。在政府投資的幫助下，2009年中國的GDP增長率達到將近9%，贏得掌聲一片。但是長期來看，這可能導致中國經濟效率降低，國進民退，使中國經濟窒息。
目前的經濟高度依賴外需，使得中國和主要交易夥伴摩擦不斷。GDP的52%由儲蓄構成，消費降到歷史新低。大多數先進民主國家政府在資本性投資上的支出不超過政府收入的8%，在中國此數字卻高達近50%。作為國民收入之一的居民收入正在下降，使得經濟擴張的同時，百姓卻感到變窮了。中國人開始希望從經濟發展中得到更多好處，中共單獨使用經濟發展來遏制、安撫社會不滿的老藥方開始失靈。
儘管坐擁無上權力，又有近期的經濟發展成績單，中共還是週期性的遇到了來自公民的反抗。1976年4月5日的事件，是中共建政後第一次自發的民主運動。 13年後的事件，和大量的後續的抗議證明中國人民在政府無法滿足願望的時候，非常希望能組織反抗。國際社會對中國國內事件的關注也非常重要。現在，中國已經變成了一個主要的全球性強權，卻忽然間開始擔心自己在國際舞臺上的合法性。
中國政府一直在努力管理如此廣泛的不滿。為了達到這個目的他們提供了各種各樣的“鎮痛藥”，包括了快速的在群眾中解決掉動亂的早期預兆，比如為下崗職工提供再就業中心，允許勞動力自由流動來降低地區間的不平衡，以及最近旨在提升農村的基礎設施、醫保，農村教育等的“新農村運動”。
但是，想要用這些措施來壓制強勢的利益集團，阻止他們影響政府，怕是勉為其難了。雖然私營企業一直都承認：和官府合作才能賺大錢，但並不是只有他們才做此想。政府本身，其裙帶網路，和國有企業快速的形成了強大的排他性利益集團。在某種意義上來說，中國的地方政府的行為和公司相似：不像在先進民主國家中，政府獲得的重要授權就是要重新分配收入，提高國民的平均福利，中國的地方政府只是在追求經濟利益。
更重要的是，北京當局持續提升GDP增長的努力將不可避免的的會侵犯到人民的經濟、政治權利。例如，在一些城市，蠻橫的土地徵收仍然盛行，政府密切的監視著互聯網，工會被壓制，工人們不得不承受長工時和不安全的工作條件。中國公民面對這些侵犯不會一直保持沉默，他們的不滿最終會變成間歇性的抗爭。不用多久，讓普通公民參與到政治過程中來的某種形式的政治轉型將成為不可或缺的。
過去30年的改革大多數都是對迫在眉睫的危機所做出的回應。日益廣泛的反抗和經濟不平衡現在正在將中國推向另一巨大的險境。強大的、享有特權的利益集團和重商的地方政府正在阻止經濟增長帶來的好處在全社會範圍內平均分配，這將使得共產黨的戰略－－用經濟增長換取人民對其絕對權力的同意－－成為徒勞。
在像美國這樣的先進民主國家中，一個開放的和包容的政治過程通常會制衡各個利益集團的權力。事實上,這正是公正政府的必要條件－－平衡不同社會群體的需求。如果適當的民主制度就位，以相互牽制大多數的強勢集團，那麼一個更加開放的中國政府依然可以保持中立。但是最終，如果中國共產黨希望鼓勵經濟發展，保持社會穩定，在更多的民主化之外不存在第二條道路。
（原載《外交》雜誌，美國「Foreign Affair」：The End of the Beijing
Consensus Can China's Model of Authoritarian GrowthSurvive?
by YangYao on 02/02/2010
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